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Abstract 
Drawing on growing social awareness, activism and scholarship, this article 
examines menstruation as an equality issue and the implications for 
discrimination law in Australia. It discusses the complex nature of inequality that 
arises in relation to menstruation. It also considers intersectional discrimination 
(when a combination of attributes generates a new form of discrimination) that 
occurs in relation to menstruation facing different groups: women and girls with 
disabilities, incarcerated women, and transgender, gender-diverse and intersex 
people. The article considers how some forms of inequality related to 
menstruation might be addressed through discrimination law (workplace 
adjustments and provision of menstrual products in carceral settings) and points 
to limitations of discrimination law or its application, such as in relation to 
sterilisation of women and girls with disabilities and strip searching of 
incarcerated women. It concludes that Australian discrimination law can only 
have a limited impact in addressing menstrual inequality. This is because: (a) the 
structure of the law is attribute-based and thus cannot address the complex 
intersections of sex and other attributes; (b) it cannot address structural 
inequality; and (c) it cannot adequately contend with embodied and abjected legal 
subjects. These conclusions have radical implications beyond menstruation 
inequality in contributing to broader discussions of how law can re-imagine 
gender difference and advance equality. 
I Introduction 
On 3 October 2018 Australian state and territory treasurers agreed to remove the 
Goods and Services Tax (‘GST’) on tampons and other menstrual products. This 
decision is evidence of the success of an 18-year campaign against a law that harms 
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a large section of the population financially because of their biology.1 Similar tax 
activism and campaigns for menstrual pride and dignity across a number of western 
nations demonstrate growing interest in issues of menstruation and its relationship 
to political, social and economic equality.2 There has also been increased attention 
to menstruation by human rights and development groups, particularly in relation to 
women’s rights to water, sanitation and hygiene.3 In this article, we draw on this 
growing social awareness, and a developing scholarship,4 to examine menstruation 
as an equality issue and the implications for discrimination law in Australia. We 
consider how some forms of inequality related to menstruation might be addressed 
through discrimination law and point to gaps where the law or its application has 
limitations.5 
The new activism and policy victories are a response to the stigma, silence 
and shame that accompanies menstruation in many societies. Despite decades of 
feminist success in improving women’s access to work, politics, education and other 
areas of public participation, aspects of their bodily experience remain as barriers to 
their full equality. Menstruation, generally a monthly occurrence for girls and 
women from puberty to menopause, is seldom mentioned in law and public policy. 
This political silence on menstruation can, in part, be explained by the shame 
associated with menstruation. Menstrual shame has its origins in menstrual taboo in 
many religions and is undoubtedly present in Western culture.6 In societies where 
																																																								
1 Amy Remeikis and Paul Karp, ‘Tampon Tax to Go as Treasurers Finally Agree to GST Exemption’, 
The Guardian (online), 3 October 2018 <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/oct/03/ 
tampon-tax-to-go-as-treasurers-finally-agree-to-gst-exemption>. 
2 Particularly in the United States (‘US’), menstruation has become such a mainstream issue in the media 
through activism focused on issues such as tampon taxes and product safety, that 2015 was declared ‘the 
year of the period’ by National Public Radio and Cosmopolitan: Anna Maltby, ‘The 8 Greatest Menstrual 
Moments of 2015’, Cosmopolitan (online), 13 October 2015 <https://www.cosmopolitan.com/ 
health-fitness/news/a47609/2015-the-year-the-period-went-public>; Malaka Gharib, ‘Why 2015 Was 
The Year of the Period, and We Don’t Mean Punctuation’, National Public Radio (online), 31 December 
2015 <https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/12/31/460726461/why-2015-was-the-year-of-
the-period-and-we-dont-mean-punctuation>. See also Abigail Jones, ‘The Fight to End Period Shaming 
is Going Mainstream’, Newsweek Magazine (online), 20 April 2016 <https://www.newsweek.com/ 
2016/04/29/womens-periods-menstruation-tampons-pads-449833.html>. 
3 See, eg, Amanda Klasing, ‘Why Menstrual Hygiene is an Urgent Human Rights Issue’, Human 
Rights Watch (online), 22 March 2018 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/22/why-menstrual-
hygiene-urgent-human-rights-issue>. See also Human Rights Watch and WASH United, 
Understanding Menstrual Hygiene Management and Human Rights (Report, August 2017) 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/news_attachments/mhm_practitioner_guide_web.pdf>.  
4 Including Chris Bobel et al (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Menstrual Studies (Palgrave, 
forthcoming): see ‘The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Menstrual Studies — Call for Ideas, Inputs & 
Suggested Chapters’, Menstrual Hygiene Day (Web Page, 2017) <http://menstrualhygieneday.org/ 
palgrave-handbook-critical-menstrual-studies-call-ideas-inputs-suggested-chapters>. Recent articles 
on menstruation, law and rights include: Inga T Winkler and Virginia Roaf, ‘Taking the Bloody Linen 
Out of the Closet: Menstrual Hygiene as a Priority for Achieving Gender Equality’ (2015) 21(1) 
Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender 1; Bridget J Crawford and Carla Spivack, ‘Tampon Taxes, 
Discrimination, and Human Rights’ [2017] (3) Wisconsin Law Review 491; Abigail Durkin, 
‘Profitable Menstruation: How the Cost of Feminine Hygiene Products is a Battle Against 
Reproductive Justice’ (2017) 18(1) Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 131. 
5 The article will examine inequality related to menstruation in the Australian context and will also 
draw on comparative examples and responses. 
6 Thomas Buckley and Alma Gottlieb (eds), Blood Magic: The Anthropology of Menstruation 
(University of California Press, 1988); Sophie Laws, Issues of Blood: The Politics of Menstruation 
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growing openness in dress and behaviour by women is tolerated, menstruation 
remains an issue requiring discreet and euphemistic mention if spoken of at all.7 
Menstrual products, problematically termed ‘feminine hygiene’8 products, make no 
reference to periods or blood and are promoted for their invisibility and capacity to 
prevent ‘accidents’, embarrassment and distress.9 When tampons are advertised they 
are often dyed with blue ink to show absorbency rather than the actual colour of 
blood since real bodily fluids are deemed too confronting.10 When women’s bodily 
functions are ‘unseen’, it is not surprising that these functions are equally invisible 
in law. This article considers how legal responses to marginalisation related to 
menstruation can challenge stigma and silence that operate to reinforce gender 
inequality. 
The failure to fully acknowledge women’s physical reality has a range of 
serious impacts alongside experiences of shame. For example, period pain may 
affect women’s employment, and menstruation may result in missed schooling. This 
article will discuss the multidimensional nature of inequality that arises in relation 
to menstruation. It will also consider the intersectional discrimination that occurs in 
relation to menstruation facing different groups of women: for example, where lack 
of menstrual self-management is used as a reason to sterilise girls and women with 
disabilities without their consent. Intersectional discrimination occurs where a 
combination of attributes generates a new form of discrimination affecting people at 
																																																								
(Macmillan, 1990); Victoria Newton, Everyday Discourses of Menstruation: Cultural and Social 
Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
7 See the following article, which originally appeared in the October 1978 issue of Ms. Magazine: 
Gloria Steinem, ‘If Men Could Menstruate’ in Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions (Open Road 
Media, 2nd ed, 2012) 718. See also Rose George, ‘What if Men Had Periods? It’s a Question Still 
Worth Posing’, The Guardian (online), 29 May 2015 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2015/may/28/what-if-men-had-periods>. This silence also has profound impacts on women’s health: 
Clementine Ford, ‘Why is it So Hard to Believe a Woman in Pain?’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 5 April 2018 <https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/health-and-wellness/why-is-it-so-hard-to-
believe-a-woman-in-pain-20180405-p4z7zb.html>. 
8 Przybylo and Fahs note that ‘[t]he phrase feminine hygiene — a relic from 1930s advertisements for 
birth control — emphasizes the dirtiness of menstrual bleeding and the aspirational “cleanliness” 
women can have when using certain products while also rendering menstrual bleeding a unilaterally 
feminine experience’: see Ela Przybylo and Breanne Fahs, ‘Feels and Flows: On the Realness of 
Menstrual Pain and Cripping Menstrual Chronicity’ (2018) 30(1) Feminist Formations 206, 211 
(emphasis in original, citations omitted). Note also the preliminary suggestions by Park of the racial 
underpinnings of ‘female hygiene’: see Shelley M Park, ‘From Sanitation to Liberation?: The 
Modern and Postmodern Marketing of Menstrual Products’ (1996) 30(2) Journal of Popular Culture 
149, 166 n 1. 
9 Though note some shifts in advertising these products in response to activism: Camilla Mørk Røstvik, 
‘Adventures in Menstruation: How Period Product Ads Have Changed to Reflect a More Realistic 
Experience for Women’, The Conversation (online), 9 March 2018 <https://theconversation.com/ 
adventures-in-menstruation-how-period-product-ads-have-changed-to-reflect-a-more-realistic-
experience-for-women-91417>. 
10 Winkler and Roaf (n 4) 6. See, eg, Chella Quint’s STAINSTM artwork: 
STAINS™ is a spoof aspirational brand. It is a line of bloodstain-themed fashions and 
accessories. … STAINS™ critiques disposable menstrual product advertising’s lack of 
engagement with blood, except for when they use ‘leakage fear’ and words like ‘whisper’ and 
‘discreet’ to shame consumers into seeking out their innovations. 
‘STAINSTM’, Dublin Science Gallery (Web Page) <https://dublin.sciencegallery.com/blood/stains>. 
 See also Period Positive, ‘Welcome to #periodpositive’, Period Positive (Web Page) 
<http://www.periodpositive.com/>. 
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the intersection of these.11 For example, while all women can experience sex 
discrimination and all black people can experience race discrimination, black 
women might experience discrimination at the intersection of sex and race, not 
experienced by white women or black men. The intersectional discrimination 
experienced by black women might be overlooked if there is a narrow focus on sex 
discrimination based only on the experiences of white women. The need to 
understand discrimination related to menstruation intersectionally also requires a 
focus on groups other than women. Although challenges to the problematic 
treatment of menstruation in society have been raised primarily by feminists in 
relation to women’s bodies, the issue does not only affect cisgender women. 
Transgender, gender-diverse and intersex people may also experience discrimination 
related to menstruation. The article will consider how expanded understandings of 
sex and gender discrimination need to inform and reshape legal responses. 
The article begins by drawing on feminist theories of the body and law to 
explain why menstruation produces legal silence and generates inequality (Part II). 
It applies equality theory to understand how treatment of menstruation leads to 
gender inequality (Part III). The article then considers the possible role of 
discrimination law in addressing discrimination related to menstruation and the 
limits of Australian law in responding to some forms of inequality arising from 
menstruation (Part IV). It goes on to explore menstruation as an intersectional issue 
through a focus on discrimination as it affects women with disabilities, incarcerated 
women and transgender, gender-diverse and intersex people (Part V). The 
concluding section argues that inequality related to menstruation is a multifaceted 
problem requiring creative use of existing law and new legal responses to achieve 
reproductive and social justice (Part VI). It identifies menstruation as an under-
examined subject of discrimination law and feminist legal theory, and suggests some 
avenues for development of the law and its application. 
II The Menstruating Body and Law 
Feminist legal scholarship contains longstanding, diverse and lively debates on 
relationships between women’s bodies, law and gender inequality. For some 
feminist legal scholars, this inequality relates to law’s reliance on medical 
knowledge to pathologise women’s bodies and to mask interventions in and control 
of women’s bodies as apolitical, therapeutic and beneficial.12 For other feminist legal 
scholars, the focus is on law’s role in inhibiting women’s capacity to exercise 
autonomy over their bodies through, for example, limiting lawful access to 
abortion.13 Reproductive justice scholars (who do not focus specifically on law) see 
women’s reproduction as a key vehicle through which individual women and entire 
marginalised populations are oppressed. These scholars draw connections between 
different aspects of regulation of reproduction and family, and also draw connections 
																																																								
11 Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ [1989] University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 139. 
12 See, eg, Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge, 1989) 90–113. 
13 See, eg, Catharine A MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 1987) ch 8 (‘Privacy v Equality: Beyond Roe v Wade’). 
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across structural dynamics such as eugenics, colonialism and neoliberalism.14 
Across these approaches, there is recognition of the contradictions and complexities 
in law’s role in sustaining gender inequality — law sometimes exposes and removes 
privacy and dignity from women and, at other times, silences, hides and shames. 
This scholarship provides important insights into the possibilities and limitations of 
discrimination law in both responding to and possibly reifying inequalities arising 
from menstruation. 
Complementing the feminist legal scholarship is feminist scholarship on 
women’s bodies. Some feminists have argued that women’s bodies are positioned 
as ‘deviant’ against the ‘norm’ of the male body.15 They have argued that the body 
is a site of discipline and normalisation.16 Problematising, and consequently 
intervening in, specific bodily processes that are gendered female is a means of 
broader social control of women and maintenance of gender (and other) 
hierarchies.17 Medicalisation is a key process through which this disciplining and 
normalisation of female bodies occurs. Shildrick argues that a medical model of the 
body is culturally dominant.18 In this model, there is a clear split between body and 
mind such that ‘the knowing subject is disembodied, detached from corporeal raw 
material’.19 This medical model of the body is gendered with women ‘being 
somehow more fully embodied than men’.20 Female embodiment is constructed as 
‘leaky’ by reason of such processes as menstruation, lactation and childbirth that 
reflect the inability of the female body to meet the norm of the idealised ‘bounded’ 
and closed male body. Shildrick argues that through menstruation ‘women, unlike 
the self-contained and self-containing man, leaked’, thus reflecting the unbounded 
and open nature of the female body.21 Shildrick observes a paradox that ‘while 
women are represented as more wholly embodied than men, that embodiment is 
never complete nor secure’.22 Instead, male bodies are constructed as possessing the 
boundaries that provide for normative selfhood of the knowing (male) subject. 
Female bodily processes, and women more generally, are excluded both culturally 
and materially, in order to protect the norm of male embodiment. Exclusion occurs 
through medical processes of surveillance, diagnosis and treatment. These medical 
processes provide an ‘objective’, scientific framework for measuring women’s 
embodiment against male norms and a basis for imposing expectations on women to 
self-regulate their bodies or, failing their ability to do so, rationalises interventions 
																																																								
14 See, eg, Loretta Ross et al (eds), Radical Reproductive Justice: Foundations, Theory, Practice, 
Critique (Feminist Press at CUNY, 2017); Rickie Solinger and Loretta J Ross, Reproductive Justice: 
An Introduction (University of California Press, 2017). 
15 Elizabeth Arveda Kissling, Capitalizing on the Curse: The Business of Menstruation (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006) 3–5. 
16 Sandra Lee Bartky, ‘Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power’ in Claudia 
Malacrida and Jacqueline Low (eds), Sociology of the Body: A Reader (Oxford University Press, 
2016) ch 2. 
17 Linda Steele, Macarena Iribarne and Rachel Carr, ‘Medical Bodies: Gender, Justice and Medicine’ 
(2016) 31(88) Australian Feminist Studies 117. 
18 Margrit Shildrick, Leaky Bodies and Boundaries: Feminism, Postmodernism and (Bio)ethics 
(Routledge, 1997). 
19 Ibid 13–14. 
20 Ibid 26. 
21 Ibid 34. 
22 Ibid 35. 
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by others.23 Shildrick’s scholarship suggests that female embodiment, the female 
body and female bodily processes are key sites for grounding women’s inequality, 
and that it is vital to consider whether discrimination law can respond to gender 
inequality arising from these sites. 
Turning specifically to menstruation, critical menstrual scholars have argued 
that menstruation and the menstruating body are central to women’s inequality. Bobel 
argues that menstruation is ‘constituted as a problem in need of a solution’,24 resulting 
in the individual discipline and collective regulation of women.25 Shail and Howie 
propose that menstrual discourse has been a key means through which gendered 
difference and maleness have been constructed,26 and menstruation ‘serves to 
provisionalise the inclusion, as human, of the female-embodied’.27 They suggest that 
menstruation is a key way through which ‘concessions of pre-discursive [ie ‘natural’ 
or ‘apolitical’] sex difference are often made’.28 There is a core contradiction inherent 
in the gendering of menstruation — Winkler and Roaf note that while menstruation 
is ‘an integral part of female identity’, ‘it goes against “feminine” attributes, by being 
bloody, smelly, and natural’.29 In a similar vein, Przybylo and Fahs have noted that 
‘[p]ervasive cultural messages of menstruation and the menstruating body as gross, 
disgusting, or shameful have created a dominant narrative of menstruation as a 
negative, troubling, problematic experience for those who menstruate’30 and that 
menstrual blood ‘necessitates containment and sanitization’.31 They argue that 
menstruation is a cultural signifier of the disordered, pathological and dangerous state 
of the female body.32 Societal responses to menstruation also enforce gendered spatial 
ordering and male privilege. For example, O’Keefe notes that ‘women’s ability to 
menstruate is used as a justification for the creation and continuation of the 
public/private divide’.33 Feminist theories of the body read together with scholarship 
on menstruation demonstrate that menstruation, a source of shame, disgust and 
abjection, is a basis for gender inequality. 
Some critical menstruation scholars have highlighted the need for a nuanced 
understanding of menstruation and gender inequality, which takes account of other 
political dynamics such as colonialism, imperialism and racial oppression and is 
mindful that not all women will experience the same kinds or degrees of inequality 
by reason of their menstruation. For example, Koja-Moolji and Ohito argue that the 
particular concern around menstrual ‘hygiene’ and girls in developing countries 
relates to ‘the leakages of [Black and Brown] bodies constitut[ing] a threat to the 
																																																								
23 Ibid 50–58. 
24 Chris Bobel, New Blood: Third-Wave Feminism and the Politics of Menstruation (Rutgers University 
Press, 2010) 31. 
25 Ibid 33. 
26 Andrew Shail and Gillian Howie, ‘Introduction: “Talking Your Body’s Language”: The Menstrual 
Materialisations of Sexed Ontology’ in Andrew Shail and Gillian Howie (eds), Menstruation:  
A Cultural History (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 1, 6. 
27 Ibid 3. 
28 Ibid 6. 
29 Winkler and Roaf (n 4) 3. 
30 Przybylo and Fahs (n 8) 210 (emphasis in original). 
31 Ibid 207. 
32 Ibid 210. 
33 Theresa O’Keefe, ‘Menstrual Blood as a Weapon of Resistance’ (2006) 8(4) International Feminist 
Journal of Politics 535, 536 (citations omitted). See also Przybylo and Fahs (n 8) 213. 
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developed, civilized, modern White body, which is the manifestation of civilization 
and, hence, a target for protective custody’.34 Thus, they argue that 
the anxieties around the periods and menstruation practices of girls in the 
global South [is] not just a health concern but also an effort to isolate Black 
and Brown bodies from ‘leaking’ into whiteness as personified by the Western 
(wo)man, who is regarded as the human rather than a type of human.35 
Koja-Moolji and Ohito’s development of Shildrick’s theory draws attention 
to the need to think about menstruation, gender inequality and discrimination law in 
colonial, racial and geopolitical contexts and to be mindful of the particularities of 
inequality in relation to different groups. We draw further on these ideas in our 
discussion of intersectionality below when we explore menstruation, gender 
inequality and discrimination law in the contexts of certain marginalised groups. 
Ultimately, this scholarship suggests the need to question the extent to which 
Australian discrimination law reduces, or instead reifies, inequalities between 
women, including whether it can respond to intersectional and structural forms of 
discrimination that might be experienced by particularly marginalised populations. 
The feminist legal theory and broader feminist theory discussed above concerning 
the treatment of women’s bodies provides a conceptual framework for our 
understanding of menstruation as an equality issue and provides a critical basis for 
exploring the role of law and discrimination law, in particular, in addressing 
inequalities related to menstruation. 
III Menstruation and Inequality 
The principle of equality of men and women that underlies prohibitions against sex 
discrimination is internationally acknowledged and specifically recognised in 
Australian law.36 In pursuit of this principle, feminists have successfully fought for 
the removal of legal barriers facing women such as the right to vote or enter certain 
professions. This ‘formal equality’, treating likes alike, remains important where 
laws are overtly discriminatory on the basis of sex. However, despite the removal of 
such laws, gender inequalities persist: for example, where women continue to accrue 
smaller superannuation balances due to time spent on unpaid care of children or 
where women make up a minority of members of parliament because they are not 
selected within political parties. Thus, without measures to address underlying 
inequalities, full equality will not be achieved. It has therefore been recognised in 
international law that equality must go beyond formal neutrality and must be 
‘substantive’, whether through different treatment or challenging and transforming 
barriers.37 The United Nations’ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
																																																								
34 Shenila Khoja-Moolji and Esther O Ohito, ‘Containing the Leakiness of Impure Inhumans: Bleeding 
Third-World Bodies and the Confining Politics of Menstrual Hygiene Campaigns’ in Susan Talburt (ed), 
Youth Sexualities: Public Feelings and Contemporary Politics (ABC-CLIO 2018) vol 1, 107, 109. 
35 Ibid 109 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). On the dehumanisation through ‘disposability’ of 
racialised women, see also Sherene Razack, ‘Gendering Disposability’ (2016) 28(2) Canadian 
Journal of Women and Law 285, 296–302. 
36 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 3(d). 
37 For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has interpreted the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as follows:  
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against Women, in interpreting the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women38 has stated that: 
The position of women will not be improved as long as the underlying causes 
of discrimination against women, and of their inequality, are not effectively 
addressed. The lives of women and men must be considered in a contextual 
way, and measures adopted towards a real transformation of opportunities, 
institutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded in historically 
determined male paradigms of power and life patterns.39 
This far-reaching idea of equality requires a deep understanding of the context and 
history of inequality and the structural patterns that underlie it. Measures targeted at 
rectifying this complex inequality must go beyond superficial changes to ensure 
fundamental social reordering. 
The development of a substantive idea of equality in response to the failings 
of earlier formal approaches has led scholars to propose a broader set of aims for 
legal measures to overcome inequality. Fredman has formulated a multi-dimensional 
approach to equality including distribution, recognition, participation and 
transformation.40 Measures to address inequality must overcome material and social 
disadvantage (distributive wrongs). They must also address stigma, stereotyping, 
humiliation and violence (recognition wrongs). In addition, they must promote the 
full and equal participation of those affected by discrimination. Lastly, they must be 
transformative in ensuring that structural change results for affected groups. This 
expansive notion of equality is a useful frame within which to consider how law 
might respond to inequality related to menstruation. It also helps to analyse the ways 
in which inequality related to menstruation manifest in society by looking at failures 
of distribution, recognition and participation and the structural factors that enable 
these failures. 
Distributive inequality related to menstruation leads to gender disadvantage. 
Research with Indigenous Australian community organisations found that girls are 
missing school during menstruation because schools lack adequate facilities 
																																																								
Formal equality assumes that equality is achieved if a law or policy treats men and women in a 
neutral manner. Substantive equality is concerned, in addition, with the effects of laws, policies 
and practices and with ensuring that they do not maintain, but rather alleviate, the inherent 
disadvantage that particular groups experience. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 16: The Equal Right of 
Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 34th sess, UN Doc 
E/C 12/2005/4 (11 August 2005) 2 [7]. 
38 Opened for signature 18 December 1979, GA Res 34/180, UN Doc A/RES/34/180 (entered into force 
3 September 1981) annex. 
39 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No 25, 
on Article 4, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, on Temporary Special Measures, UN GAOR, 30th sess, UN Doc A/59/38 (2004) 
pt one annex I [10]. 
40 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011) 25–33; Sandra 
Fredman and Beth Goldblatt, ‘Gender Equality and Human Rights: For Progress of the World’s 
Women 2015–2016’ (Discussion Paper No 4, UN Women, 2015) 1–56 <https://www.unwomen.org/-
/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2015/goldblatt-fin.pdf?la=en&vs=16
27&la=en&vs=1627>. For an application of Fredman’s approach to menstrual hygiene, see Virginia 
Roaf and Inga Winkler, ‘Menstrual Hygiene — The Bloody Road to Substantive Equality’, Oxford 
Human Rights Hub Blog (Blog Post, 26 May 2015) <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/menstrual-hygiene-the-
bloody-road-to-substantive-equality/>. 
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including soap and bins alongside running water, toilets that flush and privacy.41 
Poverty in some remote communities is exacerbated by the excessive cost of basic 
products, such as menstrual pads, which can be well above the prices charged in 
cities.42 
Recognition wrongs can result from attitudes and practices that cause stigma 
and stereotype menstruating women and girls.43 For example, menstruation has been 
used as an argument by opponents of women being allowed to enter combat roles in 
the military.44 Humiliation and loss of dignity can result from the failure to address 
the needs of menstruating women. Refugees and migrant women have talked about 
girls hiding their periods due to shame and parents’ unwillingness to discuss 
menarche, the first occurrence of menstruation, due to embarrassment.45 These 
attitudes may act as barriers to prevent women and girls from accessing reproductive 
health services.46 
Understanding inequality related to menstruation requires a close attention to 
behaviours, perceptions and meanings at the individual level, as well as at the 
broader systemic level, taking account of historical factors, social and cultural 
attitudes and economic and political forces.47 Thus, discrimination causing shame 
and discomfort due to the lack of a bin in a toilet is also about the failure to consider 
the needs of girls in designing education facilities. This may be more broadly 
connected to poor conditions in remote, Indigenous communities in a country where 
colonialism, racism and patriarchy have shaped access to schooling. Similarly, 
failure to take account of the different cultural and linguistic backgrounds of 
members of the community in service design may lead to inadequate amelioration 
of practices that cause distress and shame. 
The distributive and recognition dimensions of inequality related to 
menstruation arise in both developed and developing country contexts. They concern 
access to work, education, housing and many other areas of life impacted by 
resourcing, poverty and inadequate or inappropriate provision of facilities. Lack of 
																																																								
41 Nina Hall et al, ‘Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Remote Indigenous Australia: A Scan of Priorities’ 
(Discussion Paper, University of Queensland Global Change Institute, July 2017) 38–9 
<https://gci.uq.edu.au/filething/get/13903/UQ_WASH%20scan%20in%20Indig%20Communities-
FINAL-LR-2.pdf>. 
42 Ibid 39. Shame and taboo emanating from culture may, of course, also combine with these material 
contributors to girls missing school. 
43 Many religions place restrictions on menstruating women that limit their participation in religious 
and cultural practices, as well as daily activities. While these issues inform the argument being made 
here, a deeper consideration of their dimensions and legal implications are beyond the scope of this 
article. 
44 Anne Summers, ‘The Lady Killers: Women in the Military’, The Monthly (online), Dec 2011–Jan 2012 
<https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2011/december/1322725684/anne-summers/lady-killers>. 
45 Jane M Ussher et al, ‘Negotiating Discourses of Shame, Secrecy, and Silence: Migrant and Refugee 
Women’s Experiences of Sexual Embodiment’ (2017) 46(7) Archives of Sexual Behavior 1901, 
1908–9. However, this shame is not limited to migrant and refugee communities. Pascoe argues that 
menstrual taboos continue to affect Australian women as a whole: see Carla Pascoe, ‘The Ongoing 
Taboo of Menstruation in Australia’, The Conversation (online), 3 February 2016 
<https://theconversation.com/the-ongoing-taboo-of-menstruation-in-australia-53984>. 
46 Ussher et al (n 45) 1917. 
47 See generally, Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic 
Discrimination in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010). 
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adequate sanitation and hygiene in particular is a significant barrier to schooling and 
public participation.48 It poses a serious challenge for homeless women, including in 
wealthier countries. Even where resources are available, the decision, for example, 
to provide toilet paper in public toilets, but not tampons or pads, suggests a failure 
to consider or accommodate the needs of women in public spaces. Issues of access 
as well as attitudes go hand in hand in causing exclusion, stigma and disadvantage.  
Participation of affected groups is important in the design of initiatives to 
address inequality related to menstruation. Enabling the sharing of views by 
schoolgirls or women workers as to how they would like their schools or workplaces 
designed to accommodate their menstrual needs might lead to creative suggestions 
that school governing bodies or employers have not considered. The resulting 
policies and practices may prove more appropriate and may reflect the needs of 
different groups of women. 
Being aware of differences between groups is crucial in efforts to address 
gender inequality, including in relation to menstruation. As will be discussed in more 
detail in Part V below, other forms of group-based discrimination such as race, age, 
class, or disability may operate together with gender to compound discrimination 
related to menstruation. For example, where poor women lack access to sanitation 
or menstrual products, they may have more regular experiences of shame and 
discomfort than their wealthier counterparts. Locational factors such as 
homelessness, incarceration or living in a remote area may also deepen disadvantage 
in relation to menstruation. 
International responses to this inequality provide exemplars that Australia 
might follow. While removing the tampon tax is an important formal equality 
response to the lack of taxation attached to similar male products, a more targeted 
substantive equality response should address gendered disadvantage facing poor 
women.49 Scotland is the first country to provide free menstrual products to all 
students, both at schools and at tertiary institutions, in an effort to end ‘period 
poverty’.50 New York City has introduced laws to provide menstrual products in 
public schools, shelters and prisons.51 Even in less wealthy countries such as India, 
																																																								
48 UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Integrating Non-
discrimination and Equality into the Post-2015 Development Agenda for Water, Sanitation and 
Hygiene, UN GAOR, 67th sess, UN Doc A/67/270 (8 August 2012) 20 [73]–[74]. 
49 See Jessica Irvine, ‘Why You Should Keep Paying the “Tampon Tax”’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 18 June 2018 <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/why-you-should-keep-paying-the-
tampon-tax-20180618-p4zm81.html>; Jessica Valenti, ‘The Case for Free Tampons’, The Guardian 
(online), 11 August 2014 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/11/free-tampons-
cost-feminine-hygiene-products>. 
50 Nadia Khomami, ‘Scotland to Offer Free Sanitary Products to All Students in World First’, The 
Guardian (online), 25 August 2018 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/aug/24/scotland-
to-offer-free-sanitary-products-to-all-students-in-world-first>. 
51 Jennifer Weiss-Wolf, ‘New York Makes History, with Tampons and Pads’, The Opinion Pages: On 
The Ground (Blog Post, 21 June 2016) <https://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/06/21/new-york-
makes-history-with-tampons-and-pads/>; Jennifer Weiss-Wolf, Periods Gone Public: Taking a 
Stand for Menstrual Equity (Arcade Publishing, 2017). Three local laws were introduced to amend 
the Administrative Code of the City of New York (‘NYC Administrative Code’): (1) in relation to 
requiring that the Department of Correction issue feminine hygiene products to inmates: New York 
City Council Enactment No 2016/082, 13 July 2016 (adding a new §9-141 to the NYC Administrative 
Code title 9 ch 1); (2) in relation to the provision of feminine hygiene products: New York City 
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menstrual activism has led to legal change. In 2015, the High Court of Bombay 
recognised unequal and inadequate public provision of toilets as an equality 
violation in a decision requiring the municipal corporations within the State of 
Maharashtra to increase the number of public toilets for women in certain municipal 
areas and to include disposal facilities for menstrual products.52 These measures 
demonstrate a growing awareness that previous invisibility and inaction on the issue 
of menstruation has deepened vulnerability and hardship for certain groups of 
women and girls. Simply acknowledging that women menstruate by recognising that 
they need materials and product disposal facilities in public spaces beyond what is 
provided for the needs of men has transformative possibilities. It demonstrates that 
previous policies have been based on assumptions that the ‘normal’ user of public 
services is male, that equality may sometimes require different treatment, and that 
public expenditure may be required to remedy disadvantages that have historically 
been ignored. Such an acknowledgment may also contribute to more systemic 
change in attitudes to menstruation where, for example, the policy is broadcast 
publicly or where toilets become gender-neutral and men are exposed to the products 
and facilities usually used by women. Furthermore, it may overcome differences 
between women where homeless or indigent women are less able to attend to 
menstrual ‘hygiene’ than more advantaged women. 
This discussion of inequality related to menstruation now leads to a 
consideration of the role of discrimination law — in particular what it might 
contribute and its limitations. 
IV Discrimination Related to Menstruation:  
Legal Possibilities and Limits 
Addressing inequality through law is a large project in which discrimination law is 
but one component. Discrimination law is used to prohibit certain conduct that is 
classified as discriminatory. Discrimination, like equality, is a contested and 
complex concept and choices over where to draw legal boundaries are rooted in 
political, historical and contextual considerations, and change over time.53 
Australian law delineates the boundaries of what constitutes discrimination in a 
range of ways, including by attribute and how this is defined (such as sex, race, age, 
disability), and by scope or areas of life to which the law applies (such as work, 
education, services). In addition, a range of exceptions to prohibited discrimination 
are included in Australian discrimination laws. To add to the complexity, state54 and 
																																																								
Council, Enactment No 2016/083, 13 July 2016 (adding a new §12-207 to the NYC Administrative 
Code title 12 ch 2); (3) in relation to the provision of feminine hygiene products in schools: New 
York City Council, Enactment No 2016/084, 13 July 2016 (adding a new §21-968 to the NYC 
Administrative Code title 21-A ch 8). 
52 Milun Saryajani Through Editor v Pune Municipal Commissioner (Unreported, High Court of 
Bombay, Civil Appellate Division, AS Poka and Revati Mohite Dere JJ, 23 December 2015) [17]. 
53 See generally Margaret Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Australia 
(Oxford University Press, 1990).  
54 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA); Equal Opportunity Act 
1984 (WA); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld); Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas); Equal 
Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic). 
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territory55 discrimination laws sit alongside federal discrimination laws,56 and 
separate discrimination laws applying to the workplace.57 
Discrimination related to menstruation is likely to be considered in terms of 
the attribute of ‘sex’ since it concerns a bodily process (usually) experienced by 
women.58 All Australian discrimination laws contain prohibitions against sex 
discrimination and discrimination based on a characteristic associated with a 
particular sex.59 There are many additional related attributes that are protected: some 
of which concern biological functions connected to sex including pregnancy and 
breastfeeding; others concerning social functions associated with gender such as 
family responsibilities and marital status; and a newer set of attributes relating to 
intersex status, gender identity and sexual orientation.60 Discrimination related to 
menstruation may be likened to pregnancy and breastfeeding since it is a biological 
characteristic linked to female reproductive capacity, however it is not listed as an 
attribute in any Australian discrimination legislation nor has it been fully considered 
in any case law.61 
While ‘sex’ is not defined in any Australian discrimination legislation, it has 
been interpreted by courts to include aspects of reproduction prior to the inclusion 
of these attributes in statutes.62 In the foundational case of Wardley v Ansett 
Transport Industries,63 the Victorian Equal Opportunity Board found that a company 
policy to refuse to hire women pilots because of potential pregnancy and consequent 
maternity leave was sex discrimination. Notably, although the airline defended its 
policy on the basis of capacity for pregnancy, prior to the case the well-known 
conservative owner of the company, Sir Reg Ansett, had publicly aired his view that 
women’s menstrual cycles made them unfit to be pilots.64 While the case took a 
broad approach to sex discrimination that avoided the problem, experienced 
elsewhere, of trying to find a male comparator for a pregnant female, subsequent 
cases have taken a narrower approach to the interpretation of sex discrimination 
outside of legislated attributes.65 
																																																								
55 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT); Anti-Discrimination Act 1996 (NT).  
56 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth); Disability Discrimination 
Act 1992 (Cth); Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth). 
57 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). 
58 See discussion of people other than cisgender women who menstruate in Part V below. Menstruation 
beyond the ‘normal’ range of experience might also be considered a disability.  
59 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 5; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 24; Equal Opportunity 
Act 1984 (SA) s 29(2); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 8; Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) 
s 7(a); Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 7(1)(a); Anti-Discrimination Act 1996 (NT) s 19(1)(b);  
Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 16(e); Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) s 6(o).  
60 Beth Gaze and Belinda Smith, Equality and Discrimination Law in Australia: An Introduction 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017) 90–98; Neil Rees, Simon Rice and Dominique Allen, Australian 
Anti-Discrimination and Equal Opportunity Law (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2018) 292–331. 
61 Note some mention of menstruation in New South Wales v Amery (2003) 129 IR 300, 302–3 [11];  
Te Papa v Woolworths Ltd [2006] VCAT 1222 (3 March 2006) [14]; Watson v NSW BHP Steel Pty 
Ltd (1998) EOC 92–959, 78388–9 (concerning endometriosis). 
62 Gaze and Smith (n 60) 92 n 9–5. 
63 (1984) EOC 92–002. 
64 Liz Porter, ‘25 Years On, Pilot Fighter Lands Softly’, The Age (online), 27 June 2004 
<https://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/06/26/1088145020233.html>. 
65 Gaze and Smith (n 60) 81. 
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This narrowing through the jurisprudence has been effected by the way the 
courts have understood the meaning of direct discrimination. Direct discrimination, 
as opposed to indirect discrimination, occurs where a person is treated less 
favourably than a comparable person in the same situation because of an attribute 
such as race or sex. Indirect discrimination occurs where a facially neutral rule leads 
to different outcomes due to a protected attribute. For example, a school that requires 
all students to participate in a swimming carnival without excusing girls who are 
menstruating is discriminating indirectly against the menstruating girls who might 
face punishment if they elect not to swim. A now unlikely example of direct 
discrimination might occur where a company explicitly chooses only to hire men or 
post-menopausal women because menstruating women are thought to be moody. 
However, discrimination related to menstruation is likely to manifest in less overt 
ways and it is here that the challenges of defining direct discrimination in our law 
become apparent. 
Direct discrimination in relation to sex means less favourable treatment than 
a person of a different sex (the comparator) in the same circumstances.66 The High 
Court of Australia in the case of Purvis v New South Wales (Department of 
Education and Training)67 created a hypothetical comparator to a child whose 
disability manifested as challenging behaviour — a badly behaved child without a 
disability.68 This led the Court to find that the child with a disability had not been 
discriminated against as the school would have responded in the same way to a child 
without a disability exhibiting similar behaviour.69 A more appropriate comparator 
would have been a child without a disability who was not poorly behaved since the 
complainant’s behaviour was linked to his disability. By shifting and narrowing the 
imagined comparator, arguably the Court reduced the protections available to 
disadvantaged complainants.70 It is possible to imagine that in a case where an 
employer sanctions a female employee for working slowly due to tiredness from 
menstrual cramps, on the Purvis test, she would be compared to a man who behaves 
similarly but for other reasons, such as a hangover, rather than to a man who does 
not menstruate.71 Here, her behaviour is separated from her embodied reality, losing 
sight of the history and context of sex discrimination that attaches to women’s 
bodies. This approach also adds a moral dimension by comparing her behaviour, 
which is not within her control, to the poor behaviour of the comparator, as was done 
in Purvis. This approach undermines the idea of accommodation, which requires 
employers and others to find ways of facilitating equal participation of the person in 
the workplace, school or other environment. 
																																																								
66 This is the usual formulation in legislation dealing with sex discrimination: see, eg, Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth) s 5(1). 
67 (2003) 217 CLR 92 (‘Purvis’). 
68 Ibid 160–61 [223]–[225] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ); 100–02 [11]–[14] (Gleeson CJ),  
173 [273] (Callinan J). 
69 Ibid 101–2 [13]–[14] (Gleeson CJ). 
70 Belinda Smith, ‘From Wardley to Purvis: How Far Has Australian Anti-Discrimination Law Come 
in 30 Years?’ (2008) 21(1) Australian Journal of Labour Law 3. But also note the view that the 
Purvis decision is more limited in its reach: Rees, Rice and Allen (n 60) 103–4.  
71 Similar to the way the Federal Court of Australia in Thomson v Orica Australia Pty Ltd compared a 
woman demoted after taking maternity leave to a man who took extended leave rather than to a man 
who did not have to take maternity leave: (2002) 116 IR 186. 
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This example raises some of the challenges of dealing with discrimination 
related to menstruation. Inappropriate legal responses can reinforce stereotypes of 
women as unreliable, disruptive or uncompliant. If menstruation is compared to 
illness this can have problematic consequences by medicalising a common 
physiological feature of women’s lives. Medicalisation can also lead to protective 
responses that reinforce stereotypes of women as weak, incapable and deficient. 
While menstruation may co-exist with medical conditions such as endometriosis, in 
most cases period pain,72 heavy bleeding, tiredness and impact on mood are part of 
many women’s normal experience of menstruation and should be recognised as a 
facet of female biology that needs to be accommodated by society.73 Instead, if 
discrimination law is poorly applied it can transform this routine experience into 
something abnormal and unsettling in contrast with a norm of the consistent, un-
disrupted or undisruptive male body. In so doing it can reinforce gender 
disadvantage. As O’Connell observes: 
It is the stigmatised body that is made to ‘wear’ embodiment: the normalised 
body remains clean of bodily flaws and vulnerabilities. While acknowledging 
embodiment means that discrimination law is grounded in the reality of daily 
life, the one-sidedness of the acknowledgement reinscribes the relative 
privilege and disadvantage of the parties.74 
The problematic outcome of comparing menstruation to illness is illustrated 
in the US case of Coleman v Bobby Dodd Institute Inc75 In that case, a woman was 
warned and then dismissed from her job for accidentally bleeding on an office chair 
and then a carpet due to heavy pre-menopausal periods. The District Court of 
Georgia held that this did not constitute sex discrimination since the complainant did 
not allege that a man who soiled furniture due to incontinence would be treated 
better.76 The Court also said that menstruation was not a condition related to 
																																																								
72 Period pain is extremely common with 90 per cent of young women experiencing it monthly: Kathleen 
Calderwood, ‘World’s Largest Study into Period Pain to Help Women Understand What is Normal’, 
ABC News (online), 24 February 2018 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-02-24/period-pain-study-to-
help-women-know-whats-normal/9480042>; Mike Armour, Jane Chalmers and Melissa Parker, ‘I Have 
Painful Periods, Could it be Endometriosis?’, The Conversation (online), 29 August 2018 
<https://theconversation.com/i-have-painful-periods-could-it-be-endometriosis-101026>. 
73 Peggy Maguire et al, ‘Women and Menstruation in the EU’ (Policy Brief, European Institute of 
Women’s Health, 8 March 2018) <https://eurohealth.ie/policy-brief-women-and-menstruation-in-
the-eu/>. However, note Przybylo and Fahs who argue that absolute resistance to a medicalisation 
approach risks ‘invisibilizing’ and negating the real pain that some women experience in 
menstruation: Przybylo and Fahs (n 8). 
74 Karen O’Connell, ‘The Clean and Proper Body: Genetics, Stigma and Disability Discrimination 
Laws’ (2009) 14(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 139, 144. 
75 (D Ga, Civ No 17-029, 8 June 2017). See also Jay-Anne B Casuga, ‘Woman Fired Over Menstruation 
Settles Sex Discrimination Case’, Bureau of National Affairs (online), 7 November 2017 
<https://www.bna.com/woman-fired-menstruation-n73014471820/>; Elizabeth Segran, ‘Bleeding 
On The Job: A Menstruation Investigation’, Fast Company (online), 25 July 2016 
<https://www.fastcompany.com/3061417/bleeding-on-the-job-a-menstruation-investigation>; Kate 
Sedey, ‘Court Holds Termination for Menstruation is Not Sex Discrimination. Seriously?’, The Case 
Law Firm Blog (Blog Post, 25 August 2017) <https://www.thecaselawfirm.com/2017/08/25/court-
holds-termination-menstruation-not-sex-discrimination-seriously/>. 
76 See Coleman v Bobby Dodd Institute Inc (D Ga, Civ No 17-029, 8 June 2017). At [4], the Court did 
acknowledge the theoretical possibility of discrimination related to menstruation when it said:  
Thus, a non-frivolous argument can be made that it is unlawful for an employer to treat a 
uniquely feminine condition, such as excessive menstruation, less favorably than similar 
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pregnancy or childbirth, in distinguishing the case from one where a lactating 
woman had been successful in showing sex discrimination. The case illustrates the 
problem of the search for a hypothetical (ill) male comparator and the Court’s 
inability to understand menstruation as a feature of female biology that should 
ground a claim for sex discrimination in its own right. The discussion here also raises 
complex questions worthy of future exploration about the strategic value and risks 
of aligning menstruation with illness, disability and medicalisation. 
Menstruation may require accommodation in order to achieve substantive 
equality. It is important to find ways of making such accommodations that do not 
lead to protective responses that result in stereotyping and excluding women. This 
has been the challenge in relation to pregnancy discrimination. Protection of 
women’s employment, their health and their reproductive rights in relation to 
pregnancy has been a long struggle in the workplace in many parts of the world.77 
At the same time, protective responses have been used to prevent women from 
accessing certain occupations such as positions in the military and pilots due to their 
physical differences and reproductive capacity. Varied approaches to how pregnancy 
should be treated have been fought for in different jurisdictions.78 These differences 
reflect strategic responses to diverse anti-discrimination frameworks, but also raise 
important questions about how to understand sex and embodiment in ways that 
transform, rather than reinforce, harmful stereotyping and discriminatory responses. 
Addressing discrimination related to menstruation could involve specific measures 
such as menstruation leave, regulations allowing frequent bathroom breaks, or 
accommodations such as catch-up classes for girls who miss school due to 
menstruation-related conditions. At the same time, clear prohibitions against 
discrimination on the basis of menstruation are needed to ensure that women are not 
excluded from work, school or other institutions by those trying to avoid these 
measures and accommodations. The question of whether to make menstruation a 
defined attribute in discrimination law is ripe for future exploration. 
The question of menstruation leave is an issue that raises challenges for 
equality law. In a number of Asian countries, including Taiwan, Indonesia, Japan 
and South Korea, women are entitled to such leave.79 It is likely not coincidental that 
some of these countries rate poorly in terms of gender equality performance, as their 
menstrual leave policies may reflect paternalistic attitudes towards women. In Italy, 
where such leave has recently been considered, there are concerns that it could be 
																																																								
conditions affecting both sexes, such as incontinence. But Coleman does not claim that her 
excessive menstruation was treated less favorably than similar conditions affecting both sexes. 
Rather, she argues that the fact that her termination would not have occurred but for a uniquely 
feminine condition is alone sufficient to show that she was terminated because of her sex. The 
Court disagrees. 
77 Sandra Fredman, ‘Reversing Roles: Bringing Men into the Frame’ (2014) 10(4) International 
Journal of Law in Context 442; Alexandra Heron and Sara Charlesworth, ‘Effective Protection of 
Pregnant Women at Work: Still Waiting for Delivery?’ (2016) 29(1) Australian Journal of Labour 
Law 1. For a discussion of the US context, see Reva B Siegel, ‘Pregnancy as a Normal Condition of 
Employment: Comparative and Role-Based Accounts of Discrimination’ (2018) 59(3) William & 
Mary Law Review 971. 
78 Fredman (n 77). 
79 Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt and Kathryn Robinson, ‘“Period Problems” at the Coalface’ (2008) 89(1) 
Feminist Review 102; Alice J Dan, ‘The Law and Women’s Bodies: The Case of Menstruation Leave 
in Japan’ (1986) 7(1–2) Health Care for Women International 1. 
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used by employers to reduce the number of women employed in a country that 
already has low female employment, and that it will contribute to stereotyping about 
women’s emotions during menstruation.80 The existence of menstruation leave does 
not necessarily improve working conditions for women if women fear that using 
such leave will disadvantage their prospects of workplace advancement. At the same 
time, responses to leave may differ depending on the type of work women do since 
labourers may have greater need for such leave than office workers.81 The challenge 
in addressing menstruation in the workplace is therefore highly complex, as it might 
require accommodation, but this must avoid reinforcing stereotypes or increasing 
disadvantage. 
Creative efforts to reimagine the workplace as a space that accommodates 
menstruation without this disadvantage are being trialled by the Victorian Women’s 
Trust, which argues against labelling menstruation as an illness. The Trust 
encourages other employers to adopt their policy, which allows employees 
flexibility to do the following: work from home; ‘stay in the workplace under 
circumstances which encourage the comfort of the employee eg. resting in a quiet 
area’; or take a day’s paid leave (up to 12 per year).82 Other forms of accommodation 
could be considered in schools — for example, providing alternative exam dates for 
girls affected by period pain. 
Where such efforts are not occurring, the Australian anti-discrimination 
framework offers some possibilities for women affected by discrimination related to 
menstruation to challenge unequal treatment. However, there are a number of well-
worn concerns with the limits of this framework in addressing gender inequality.83 
Discrimination law is focused on individual complaints and rarely results in systemic 
responses. Enforcement often results in settlements that are confidential, so most 
matters do not reach courts and hence lack a broader public impact. The law is 
largely reactive, rather than proactive, in identifying inequality and responding to it. 
While some efforts have been made to encourage affirmative action and positive 
measures in the workplace,84 these do not extend to other areas of society and have 
their own limitations.85 The lack of a general right to equality at the federal level and 
in most states and territories means that the scope and reach of anti-discrimination 
																																																								
80 Anna Momigliano, ‘Italy Set to Offer “Menstrual Leave” for Female Workers’, The Independent 
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81 Lahiri-Dutt and Robinson (n 79). 
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Too’, Victorian Women’s Trust Blog (Blog Post, 23 May 2017) <https://www.vwt.org.au/blog-
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83 See Thornton (n 53); Dominique Allen, ‘Rethinking the Australian Model of Promoting Gender 
Equality’ in Kim Rubenstein and Katharine G Young (eds), The Public Law of Gender: From the 
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85 See Allen (n 83). 
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protection is somewhat limited. Legislative exemptions and court interpretations 
have further limited the reach of these laws. 
An additional problem in some jurisdictions, built into the structure of 
separate discrimination laws dealing with different attributes, is the difficulty of 
bringing complaints based on discrimination that occurs at the intersection of two or 
more grounds. A woman facing discrimination related to menstruation must often 
choose whether to bring her claim as one of sex discrimination or instead based on 
age, disability, race, etc. However, in reality, human experience is not so neatly 
bounded and attributes may combine to compound discrimination or may lead to 
new forms of discrimination that do not affect people falling within a single attribute 
alone. Thus, using a single attribute model can lead to injustice.86 International law 
has overcome this problem by building in an understanding of intersectionality into 
its approach to substantive equality.87 Some countries have also found ways of 
addressing this in legislation or within their constitutional equality frameworks,88 
but all Australian jurisdictions are yet to adopt this approach. The article now turns 
to a consideration of the ways in which intersectional inequality related to 
menstruation impacts on women with disabilities, incarcerated women and people 
who menstruate who do not identify as cisgender women. This demonstrates the 
need for discrimination law frameworks that are able to shift from narrow attribute-
based approaches to a broader and more substantive understanding of the purpose of 
discrimination law. 
V Inequality Related to Menstruation at the Intersections 
Critical menstrual scholars have argued that gender inequality relating to 
menstruation is exacerbated for women who are positioned outside of normative 
constructs of the white, able, middle-class woman.89 For example, discrimination 
related to menstruation may arise in the unequal treatment of girls who have, or have 
not yet, begun menstruating (based on age or physical maturity); it may be targeted 
at women with disabilities who are seen as incapable of menstrual management; it 
may have a more extreme impact on women who are experiencing poverty or 
homelessness;90 and it may affect women in certain cultural or religious 
communities or geopolitical regions differently.  
The differential forms and impacts of gender inequality related to 
menstruation are not accidental or incidental. Reproductive justice scholars and 
activists have long argued that women’s enjoyment of bodily integrity and capacity 
to make choices concerning reproduction and parenting are shaped by dynamics of 
																																																								
86 Crenshaw (n 11). 
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systemic inequality. In particular, these relate to ‘institutional forces such as racism, 
sexism, colonialism and poverty’,91 as well as such factors as ‘immigration status, 
ability, gender identity, carceral status, sexual orientation, and age’.92 In this respect, 
gender inequality related to menstruation needs to be understood through the prisms 
of intersecting dimensions of oppression and intersecting structural or institutional 
forces. These forces might be materially and legally disconnected or even irrelevant 
from the perspective of the inequality encountered by more privileged women. 
When we use a more nuanced intersectional analysis and specifically 
interrogate gender inequality relating to menstruation for women who do not meet 
normative female gender roles, we find that this inequality manifests in very 
different ways that engage broader structural inequality (and structural violence). 
This article, in calling for more sustained scholarly engagement with menstruation, 
gender inequality and discrimination law, signals the need for caution in how this is 
approached so as not to reinstate the ‘universalized [menstruating] woman’.93 We 
now introduce empirical data on inequality related to menstruation as it relates to 
women with disabilities, incarcerated women, and transgender, gender-diverse and 
intersex people, and we question the extent to which Australian discrimination law 
can respond to these particular manifestations of inequality. 
A Women with Disabilities 
In a context where females are constructed as deficient vis-à-vis males, feminist 
disability scholars have argued that women and girls with disabilities are positioned 
against norms of the able female. This gives rise to greater degrees and different 
forms of discrimination, violence and marginalisation when compared to women and 
girls without disabilities.94 In relation to menstruation, women and girls with 
disabilities (and specifically women with cognitive impairments) are viewed as 
mentally and physically incapable of meeting gendered norms to conceal their 
menstrual blood and regulate their emotions purportedly associated with their 
menstrual cycle.95 Noting menstruation’s role in reproduction, these women and 
girls are also viewed as incapable of controlling their sexuality and managing their 
fertility.96 Additionally, menstruation and its signifying of sexuality and fertility is 
seen as placing women at greater risk of sexual abuse — or, rather, at greater risk of 
pregnancy from abuse, since removing the capacity to menstruate removes one of 
the signs of abuse, rather than the abuse itself.97 In being considered unable to self-
manage their bodily processes, women and girls with disabilities are consistently 
viewed as burdens on those who provide care to them. Menstruation is seen as an 
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additional and superfluous source of labour and time for carers because often women 
and girls with disabilities are viewed as not needing menstruation for fertility 
reasons,98 reflecting the observation by Przybylo and Fahs that for women and girls 
with disabilities ‘menstruation is seen as unnecessary, excessive, and tied to ableist 
reproductive hopes’.99 
Research on women with intellectual disabilities has found that this group 
experiences difficulties and discrimination in relation to menstruation in a variety of 
ways.100 Women may not be given adequate information about menstruation or 
menstrual management because it is assumed they are incapable of understanding 
this information. In one study women with disabilities avoided discussing 
menstruation with men due to embarrassment and fear that by providing evidence of 
female bodily functions they might expose themselves to abuse.101 They also 
avoided requesting pain medication from carers, particularly men, and lacked control 
to self-medicate for menstrual pain.102 Women experienced embarrassment and fear 
due to internalised stigma when they felt they had created a ‘mess’ or failed to meet 
perceived menstrual ‘etiquette’.103 Their experiences of menstruation were generally 
negative and disempowering and arguably to a greater extent than women without 
disability, since their bodies were so often subject to control and surveillance by 
carers and medical personnel. This assertion of control may result from the 
discomfort of society with seeing women with disabilities as adult women, as sexual 
and as fertile.104 
Sterilisation is a particularly violent dimension of gender inequality related 
to menstruation for women and girls with disabilities. It is a surgical procedure that 
has historically been carried out as a form of eugenic social control on a diverse 
range of women deemed genetically unfit — for example, Indigenous women, poor 
women, incarcerated women, women with disabilities. In contemporary times, 
sterilisation has fallen out of favour as a systemic state-legislated process targeted at 
disabled, racialised, poor, migrant or incarcerated women. Yet, sterilisation is still 
legal in relation to a woman or girl with disabilities where it is perceived to be in 
such an individual’s ‘best interests’. In this context, courts play a key role in 
protecting women and girls with disabilities from arbitrary sterilisation through an 
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individualised justice approach.105 In Australia, parents of girls (under family law), 
guardians of women (under guardianship legislation) and doctors (under the doctrine 
of necessity) can make decisions to authorise sterilisation. Those who perform the 
sterilisation are protected from civil and criminal actions in assault, even though the 
woman or girl has not personally consented to the procedure.106 
Where this sterilisation involves the removal of a women’s uterus, it can be 
used to prevent women with disabilities from menstruating.107 In this ‘progressive’ 
era of sterilisation, menstruation has emerged as a basis on which sterilisation can 
be authorised. Since the 1980s, judicial decisions show that sterilisation has been 
used specifically to prevent menstruation by girls with disabilities for the purported 
benefit of the individuals themselves and their carers. Reasons include 
menstruation’s impact on: quality of life (for example, ability to participate in 
education and social events, receive good quality care); behaviour (for example, 
distress and inability to cope with menstruation and ‘poor hygiene practices’108) and 
existing health conditions (for example, hormonal impacts on epilepsy).109 Insofar 
as menstruation signals entry into womanhood, the lawfulness and social acceptance 
of sterilisation of girls with disabilities to prevent menstruation evidences legal and 
social discomfort with sexuality and disability because of infantilising of girls with 
disabilities as eternal children.110 
The centrality of stigma associated with disability and menstruation is 
illuminated by Australian court decisions from the 1980s and 1990s relating to the 
power of the Family Court of Australia to authorise the sterilisation of girls with 
disabilities under its welfare jurisdiction. In one decision, the judge expressed the 
need to use sterilisation to avoid the ‘frightening and unnecessary experience’ of 
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being in public with visible bleeding.111 In another case, the judge described 
sterilisation of a girl as ‘lessen[ing] the physical burdens for the mother, in particular 
by decreasing the number of changes necessary in toileting’.112 Another judge 
dismissed a menstrual management education program as an alternative to 
sterilisation because his Honour considered it ‘difficult to avoid the feeling, that 
here, perhaps too much reliance is being placed on the success of what are possibly 
imperfect programs, imperfectly administered and monitored upon, sadly, an 
imperfect subject’.113 
The gender inequality arising from sterilisation is profound. There are risks 
and potential side effects associated with surgical procedures, as well as increased 
risk of some cancers.114 In addition, the peak body for Australian women with 
disabilities, Women with Disabilities Australia, state: 
Forced sterilisation permanently robs women of their reproductive capacity, 
violates their physical integrity and bodily autonomy, and leads to profound 
and long-term physical and psychological effects, including: psychological 
pain, suffering, lifelong grief and trauma, extreme social isolation, family 
discord or breakdown, fear of medical professionals, social stigma, and 
shame.115 
Women and girls who are sterilised become further entrenched as unequal to women 
without disabilities in being denied the choice to menstruate, to reproduce and to 
give birth to children.116 
Recent government inquiries in Australia have suggested that the number of 
sterilisations has decreased.117 While this might suggest the practice is not as 
significant a concern in terms of gender inequality related to menstruation, instead 
we argue that it is for two reasons. First, there are no definitive statistics to confirm 
this decline in sterilisations and individuals may still have undergone procedures 
without seeking court authorisation. The laws permitting sterilisation still exist and 
recent government inquiries have resisted outlawing sterilisation118 and one even 
explicitly affirmed that sterilisation is non-discriminatory.119 Indeed, the Australian 
Government has considered sterilisation in the context of its inquiry into the family 
																																																								
111 Re Jane (1988) 12 Fam LR 662, 681 (Nicholson CJ). 
112 Re Katie (1996) FLC 92-659, 82817 (Warnick J). 
113 Re a Teenager (1988) 94 FLR 181, 190 (Cook J). 
114 Australian Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Involuntary 
or Coerced Sterilisation of People with Disabilities in Australia (Report, July 2013) 8. 
115 Women With Disabilities Australia (‘WWDA’), ‘WWDA Position Statement 4: Sexual and 
Reproductive Rights’ (Statement, September 2016) <http://wwda.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
10/Position_Statement_4_-_Sexual_and_Reproductive_Rights_FINAL_WEB.pdf> 10. 
116 Linda Steele, ‘Court-Authorised Sterilisation and Human Rights: Inequality, Discrimination and 
Violence against Women and Girls with Disability?’ (2016) 39(3) University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 1002, 1034. 
117 See, eg, Diana Bryant AO, Submission No 36 to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of People with Disabilities 
in Australia, February 2013. 
118 Steele, ‘Court-Authorised Sterilisation’ (n 116). See, eg, Australian Senate Community Affairs 
References Committee (n 114); New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Review of the 
Guardianship Act 1987, Report 145 (2018). 
119 Australian Senate Community Affairs References Committee (n 114). 92–4 [4.31]–[4.37]; 125–9 
[5.100]–[5.112]. 
314 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 41(3):293 
law system, suggesting this is a perennial issue that endures the scrutiny of law 
reform review.120 Second, any reduction in the number of sterilisations undertaken 
might be accompanied by an increased use of menstrual suppressing 
pharmaceuticals.121 In an Australian context, Women with Disabilities Australia has 
noted that ‘[t]he use of menstrual suppressant drugs on girls and women with 
intellectual and/or cognitive impairment, particularly those in institutional and other 
closed settings, is widespread’122 and ‘is rarely, if ever, subject to independent 
monitoring or review’.123 There is an argument that chemical forms of non-
consensual menstrual suppression are acceptable because they avoid the risks and 
harms of surgery. However, this overlooks that use of these pharmaceuticals is based 
on the same logic that menstruation is unnecessary, superfluous and burdensome for 
women and girls with disabilities and also ignores the fundamental denial of 
autonomy for women, while reaffirming stigma associated with menstruation. 
Arguably non-consensual surgical intervention to prevent menstruation of 
women and girls with disabilities is an example of unequal treatment insofar as this 
would not be allowed in relation to women and girls without disabilities. While 
health services are covered by disability discrimination and sex discrimination 
legislation, one obstacle to making such a discrimination claim is the unhelpful case 
law on sterilisation of girls with disabilities. The cases have held that sterilisation 
under the Family Court of Australia’s welfare jurisdiction is not discriminatory 
because there is no comparator to establish unfavourable treatment of women with 
disabilities. In the 1995 decision of P v P,124 the Full Court rejected the inclusion of 
a ‘but for’ question (‘but for the disability, would this girl be sterilised?’) in the best 
interests test for authorising sterilisation. The Court was of the view that while a ‘but 
for’ test might be ‘superficially attractive’ because it ‘is non-discriminatory and 
equates the intellectually handicapped person with the non-intellectually 
handicapped’, the test is ‘conceptually incorrect’.125 It was deemed so because the 
Court found it was impossible to identify a comparator for such a test: 
The Court’s logic involved it being impossible to remove from Lessli the 
characteristic of her intellectual disability in order to determine whether she 
would still be sterilised without her disability. The core and necessary 
question of any discrimination inquiry — would this sterilisation be 
conducted if this individual was not disabled — could not be answered here 
because there was no way to comprehend Lessli existing as ‘Lessli’ without 
the disability.126 
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This legal position was approved in the recent Senate inquiry into involuntary 
or coerced sterilisation of people with disabilities in Australia.127 The Senate 
Committee recommended that sterilisation not be abolished, but instead be allowed 
to continue under a reformed test of ‘best protection of human rights’ (cf ‘best 
interests’). The Committee agreed with the Family Court’s reasoning on 
discrimination in P v P. The Committee was of the view that the ‘best protection of 
rights’ test would not extend to protection of rights to equality and non-
discrimination.128 This is not just a misguided understanding of disability 
discrimination law, but is also an example of the Court’s inability to focus on two 
forms of discrimination at once (disability and sex) and their intersection. The 
absence of legal mechanisms for addressing intersectional discrimination, which 
emerges from this article’s close analysis of menstrual inequality, is a key limitation 
with Australian discrimination law generally and has widespread ramifications for 
extremely marginalised populations in Australia. 
B Incarcerated Women 
There are different dynamics of gendered inequality in relation to menstruation for 
women who are incarcerated in prisons, policy custody, mental health facilities and 
immigration detention centres. As noted by reproductive justice scholars and 
activists, the dynamics of this inequality are situated in institutional dynamics of 
colonialism, neoliberalism and eugenics and can be inextricably linked to carceral 
circumstances such as control, degradation and humiliation.129 
For example, Australian media130 recently reported on an Aboriginal woman 
in Western Australia being transported from a prison to a mental health facility in a 
state of distress, while naked and menstruating.131 The Sydney Morning Herald 
reported on an interview with a woman who had been in custody, who said that, ‘[i]n 
my experience, and other women’s experience, [women] have asked repeatedly after 
six, 10, 12 hours for sanitary items and have not been getting them’ and that ‘the 
denial of sanitary items to women in holding cells can act as a power play for the 
officers in charge, particularly when they are dealing with inmates who are 
																																																								
127 Australian Senate Community Affairs References Committee (n 114). 
128 Ibid 130–31. For a detailed critique, see Steele, ‘Court-Authorised Sterilisation’ (n 116). 
129 Ross (n 91); Ross et al (n 14); Solinger and Ross (n 14). 
130 For overseas examples, see Caroline Mortimer, ‘Police “Routinely Ignoring” Needs of Female Detainees 
on Periods, Warns Watchdog’, The Independent (online), 4 January 2018 <https://www.independent.co.uk/ 
news/uk/crime/police-women-periods-ignore-needs-female-detainees-cctv-suspects-cells-arrest-tampons-
sanitary-a8141101.html>; Tamar Kraft-Stolar, ‘Reproductive Injustice: The State of Reproductive Health 
Care for Women in New York State Prisons’ (Report, Women in Prison Project of the Correctional 
Association of New York, 2015) <https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/Reproductive-Injustice-FULL-
REPORT-FINAL-2-11-15.pdf>; Durkin (n 4) 16; Tomi-Ann Roberts, ‘Bleeding in Jail: Objectification, 
Self-Objectification and Menstrual Injustice’ (2018), draft paper for submission to The Palgrave Handbook 
of Critical Menstrual Studies (Palgrave, forthcoming) (copy on file with authors). 
131 Sarah Collard, ‘Woman’s Naked Prison Transfer Prompts Calls to Change System for Mentally Ill 
Inmates’, ABC News (online), 26 March 2018 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-26/naked-
woman-prison-transport-prompts-calls-to-change-system/9585380>. 
316 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 41(3):293 
aggressive or experiencing drug induced psychosis’.132 In a 2017 report, the 
Northern Territory (‘NT’) Ombudsman noted that: 
Many female prisoners said that while they were provided with very basic 
toiletries on induction and sanitary items are free, they are required to request 
in person for sanitary items from prison officers. The women advised that 
requesting sanitary items from a male prison officer is ‘shame job’ and not 
appropriate according to Indigenous culture.133 
The Ombudsman went on to advise that: 
Corrections should review its current procedure in relation to issuing sanitary 
items to female prisoners by a male prison officer and implement a procedure 
that will allow women prisoners to obtain sanitary items from female prison 
officers only or consider installing a sanitary vending machine at one or more 
locations within the female sector.134 
There are also many documented examples in Australia of gender inequality 
in the context of strip searching of women who are menstruating. The trauma and 
violence associated with strip searching women in prison, particularly women who 
have themselves been victims of sexual assault, are well-known.135 However, what 
is perhaps less apparent is the significance of menstruation to the humiliation and 
degradation associated with strip searching. A number of Australian states and 
territories have published reports on strip searching, and some of these explicitly 
address menstruation issues. In 2002, a report by the then-Australian Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission cited women’s prisoner activist Debbie Kilroy: 
Indigenous women in Brisbane Women’s Prison are subjected to a full strip 
search including cough and squat after every visit (family - legal). If the 
Indigenous woman is menstruating she is required to remove her tampon or 
pad and hand it to the screw [prisoner officer] for disposal.136 
Kilroy noted the dilemma facing these women: ‘They have to decide to be subjected 
to this indignity and sexual abuse in order to see their family or have legal 
counsel’.137 In a 2014 report devoted to strip searching at Townsville Women’s 
Correctional Centre, the Queensland Ombudsman discussed an allegation that  
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on occasion menstruating prisoners receiving … medication were unable to 
access sanitary material between the first strip search (when they would be 
required to remove any sanitary pad) and the second strip search, and that 
prisoners found this humiliating.’138 
Menstrual inequality was also noted in the final report of the Royal Commission 
into the Protection and Detention of Children in the Northern Territory in the course 
of finding that ‘[f]emale detainees’ needs relating to menstruation were not met at the 
former Don Dale Youth Detention Centre’.139 The report elaborated: 
The special needs of females in detention include adequate provision and 
choice of sanitary products and open access to washing during menstruation. 
These special needs were not met and female detainees experienced 
humiliating and degrading treatment as a result. 
At least at the former Don Dale Youth Detention Centre, female detainees 
were not permitted to keep sanitary products in their cells and were often 
required to ask male officers for them, with no choice of tampons or pads. 
Some girls were too embarrassed or ashamed to ask male officers for such 
items. AG said sometimes other girls would ask her to ask the male guards for 
them. Because the cells at the former Don Dale Youth Detention Centre did 
not have toilets or showers, females were also unable to go to the toilet or take 
a shower discreetly, without making a request of staff, if the need arose during 
menstruation. As recognised in NAAJA’s submissions, it is ‘completely 
culturally inappropriate for Aboriginal girls to have to speak about such 
matter[s] with male staff’.140 
Discrimination in these instances relates to sex, race, and location 
(incarceration). In addition, this discrimination is situated in structural inequality, 
since not all women have equal chances of being incarcerated. Women from 
marginalised population groups such as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, 
people with psychosocial and cognitive disabilities and people experiencing poverty 
have greater exposure to criminalisation and are particularly disadvantaged in the 
criminal justice system.141 Challenging such discrimination would be best achieved 
with legal responses that acknowledge intersectionality and structural discrimination 
— such ideas currently fall outside of Australian discrimination law. 
These issues of menstruation-related discrimination against incarcerated 
women have also arisen in the context of Australian immigration detention.142 A 
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2015 report of a Senate Committee inquiry into the Nauru Immigration Detention 
Centre noted that women had restricted access to sanitary products for security 
reasons.143 One reason offered for the lack of easy access to pads was that, ‘pads 
were a security hazard as they were allegedly soaked in gasoline during 2013 riots 
at the centre’ (although Australian Greens Senator Hanson-Young noted there were 
no female detainees at the centre during the riots).144 Milanowicz, a former 
immigration caseworker for Hanson-Young, noted the humiliating situation of 
women in immigration detention having to line up for up to four hours to request 
pads from male guards.145 Paediatric nurse Alanna Maycock visited Manus Island 
on the invitation of International Health and Medical Services, which provided 
health services on the island. She recounted a story that was told to her: 
One mother we met had been menstruating for around two months. She said 
she had reported this several times but had not been referred to a gynaecologist 
[sic] for review of her symptoms. She was using material from her tent to hold 
the bleeding because she didn’t have free access to sanitary products. And one 
night the bleeding was so bad and she was extremely dirty, she decided to 
make the journey to the toilet. As she got near to the toilet where the male 
guards were sitting a blood clot fell from her to the ground. This women [sic] 
ran to the toilet as a trail of blood followed her.146 
Discrimination law could be used responsively to achieve access to sanitary 
products for incarcerated women, who are generally from less financially privileged 
backgrounds and who face restricted provision of these products by the institutions 
themselves.147 Yet, addressing access must go beyond financial access and 
additionally take into account multidimensional inequalities encountered by women 
who are incarcerated.148 The participation of women in carceral settings is critical in 
ensuring that appropriate and transformative responses are developed to overcome 
this profound discrimination related to menstruation. 
Arguably prison custody, correctional facilities, mental health facilities and 
onshore immigration detention centres would all be covered by state or territory and 
federal sex discrimination legislation insofar as these constitute ‘services’ or 
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‘facilities’.149 Lack of access to sanitary products has been described as 
discriminatory in government reports. For example, the NT Royal Commission Report 
discussed above stated that denial of access to menstrual products ‘was inconsistent 
with the human right to be free from discrimination on the grounds of sex’.150 
The Queensland Anti-Discrimination Commission considered the issue of 
strip searching and discrimination.151 The Commission was of the view that strip 
searching of female detainees — mandatory in order to have family visits — might 
be indirect discrimination. This was because it imposed an unreasonable requirement 
on women — more women than men were likely to choose not to have family visits 
in order to avoid having to comply with this requirement due to the higher rates of 
sexual assault trauma among women detainees.152 It might also constitute disability 
discrimination given the more frequent use of strip searching in crisis units where 
being placed in these units relates to a mental health condition or period of acute 
mental distress, given that it is ‘a term or requirement of the prison authorities that a 
strip-search is conducted on every female prisoner in crisis units each time she leaves 
or re-enters her cell after being in another part of the unit or prison’ resulting in 
searches up to six times per day.153 In relation to whether the indirect discrimination 
is ‘reasonable’ and hence lawful, the Commission stated: 
While the use of certain drugs continues to be illegal in Queensland, and 
certain prisoners are at high risk of self-harm, or pose a serious escape risk, it 
could be argued that the use of strip searching is reasonable and justified, if 
no other forms of searching are as effective. 
However, if an individual prisoner is assessed as having a low risk of escape 
or self-harm, routine mandatory strip-searching may not be reasonable.154 
Gender inequality by reason of strip searching menstruating women might, 
however, be caught by various exemptions. For example, s 7B of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) exempts indirect discrimination if it is ‘reasonable in 
the circumstances’. The Queensland Anti-Discrimination Commission also noted 
possible exemptions under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) that may apply: 
‘public health (s107), workplace health and safety (s108), and acts done in 
compliance with legislation (s106)’. However, the frequency of strip-searching 
might render it indirect discrimination.155 The Commission recommended a 
reduction of the number of strip searches on women in crisis units and the 
amendment of policies to ensure that women detainees are not subjected to less 
favourable treatment than males in relation to family visit strip searches.156 
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In this example of strip-searching, discrimination law relates to the provision 
of the ‘service’ of detention, rather than the fact of inequality in relation to 
incarceration. Thus, there are challenges in using sex discrimination legislation in a 
carceral context because of both the taken-for-granted status of incarceration per 
se,157 as well as the structural conditions that result in certain population groups 
being more likely to end up incarcerated. Yet, these structural features are central to 
the inequality related to menstruation experienced by women who are 
incarcerated.158 For example, in the Human Rights Law Centre Report on strip 
searching, the authors acknowledge that Indigenous women, women with mental 
illness and women with disabilities are over-represented in prison populations and 
will also be disproportionately impacted by strip searching.159 They explain: 
‘Marginalisation, violence, oppression and discrimination, and their cumulative and 
intersecting effects, in turn influence the experience and frequently exacerbate the 
harm of strip searches’.160 To this end, the Human Rights Law Centre Report makes 
recommendations not only concerning the use of strip searching, but also the 
reduction of the number of women in prison. 
Being mindful of Fredman’s multidimensional approach to equality, the 
discussion in this section has illuminated the limits of Australian discrimination law 
to be transformative because it cannot facilitate structural change for groups of 
women most at risk of incarceration.  
C Transgender, Gender-Diverse and Intersex People 
While menstruation is gendered female, in terms of embodiment, it is not only 
cisgender women who menstruate. As noted by transgender artist and menstrual 
health activist Cass Clemmer: ‘Not all people who menstruate are women, and not 
all women menstruate’.161 Various people across the sex and gender spectrums 
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respectively may menstruate. Gender inequality arising from menstruation exists, 
but might take different forms, in relation to transgender and gender-diverse people 
(gender), and intersex people (sex), and certainly this is gaining more recognition in 
popular media.162 For example, a trans man who is menstruating may encounter 
misunderstanding alongside disgust due to sexism and transphobia.163 Similarly, a 
person who identifies as being gender-diverse or of non-binary gender may already 
face public pressure to categorise themselves more definitively as ‘male’ or 
‘female’.164 Also, a person who is intersex may face ‘othering’ and conflation of sex 
(a physiological characteristic) with gender (an identity).165 When such individuals 
are discriminated against on the basis of their menstruation, which is likely to be 
abnormalised when the person is not a ciswoman, existing prejudices and 
disadvantage against their LGBTQI+ (‘Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer 
and intersex’) status may be exacerbated further. 
Scholarly engagement in relation to gender inequality, menstruation and 
transgender, gender-diverse and intersex people requires legal responses that do not 
conflate gender inequality with discrimination against ciswomen.166 The association 
between menstruation and ciswomen can be discriminatory for ciswomen and, 
additionally, for those who do menstruate but do not conform to conventional female 
gender image or roles. In the latter circumstances, administrative systems, health 
services, health information and education and other structures that address 
menstruation as associated with ciswomen can themselves enforce further 
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discrimination through imposing arbitrary gender segregation in how people are 
categorised and, in turn, treated in relation to their menstruation. 
A deeper level of complexity in intersectional discrimination is illustrated by 
inequality related to menstruation that manifests in very specific ways for 
incarcerated transgender, gender-diverse and intersex people. While there is limited 
empirical data on this in Australia, recent government reports related to incarcerated 
women, discussed above in Part VB, suggest this is of concern. For example, in the 
Human Rights Law Centre Report on strip searching, the authors acknowledge 
(without specifically addressing menstruation) that transgender, gender-diverse and 
intersex people will also be disproportionately impacted by strip searching.167 There 
is more available data overseas. Spade, a US scholar, relates an account of a 
transgender man with intersex features who was degraded by prison officers when 
he menstruated: 
Jim, a 25-year-old transman, was desperate for help: he was facing a severe 
threat of rape and already experiencing harassment. … The jail 
administration’s refusal to continue Jim’s testosterone treatments had caused 
him to menstruate; when Jim was strip searched while menstruating, other 
inmates and staff learned of his status.168 
The US Sylvia Rivera Law Project has noted the significant discrimination 
experienced by transgender men in prison: 
The men we represent are already denied their gender identity on a regular 
basis. Our clients experience continual refusal by correctional officers to be 
referred to with the rights [sic] names or pronouns, continual refusal to have 
their gender identity respected, and punishment for any expression of 
masculinity. Menstrual health products are no more gendered than toilet paper 
or other necessities of daily living, yet we continue to live in a world where 
many men are shamed for the needs of their body, and everyone from other 
incarcerated people to DOCCS [Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision] staff use the need for menstrual health products to reify shameful 
messages about the body and transphobic tropes. No person who needs to use 
menstrual health products should have to rely on another individual to access 
them.169 
The Project report notes that there is also a racialised dimension to this 
inequality because black transgender men were more likely to spend time in solitary 
confinement, which limited their access to work to earn money to purchase sanitary 
products.170 These issues of gender inequality and menstruation fit into a broader 
matrix of discrimination and violence experienced by transgender, gender-diverse 
and intersex people in carceral settings.171 They also reflect socioeconomic factors 
that might impact on their criminalisation — for example, expense of accessing 
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hormone treatment, and social isolation due to stigma associated with people who 
do not conform to ‘typical’ gender or sex norms.172  
The growing awareness of LGBTQI+ issues and the expanded boundaries of 
how we understand sex and gender require adaptations to the traditional approaches 
to discrimination law and other areas of the law in relation to menstruation. 
Arguably, this has been achieved to some extent through reforms to discrimination 
legislation. In 2013, the Australian Parliament amended the Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 (Cth) to extend protection from discrimination to grounds of sexual orientation, 
intersex status, and gender identity.173 These widely defined protected attributes 
have also been adopted in South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, and 
Tasmania,174 while the other states and territories each protect a variation of sexual 
orientation and gender identity, but not intersex status.175 However, the effectiveness 
of these reforms and protections have not necessarily been explored and tested in 
relation to menstruation. As menstruation is a physiological characteristic associated 
with the female sex, as discussed above, it is arguable that a court may treat 
discrimination on the basis of menstruation as being solely sex discrimination, rather 
than discrimination on the basis of gender identity or intersex status. However, a 
person may menstruate while not being of predominantly female ‘sex’. Again, the 
requirement to identify discrimination on the basis of one particular attribute in 
Australia may limit the ability for transgender, gender-diverse and intersex people 
to seek remedies under discrimination law. 
VI Concluding Thoughts and Areas for Further Inquiry 
In an era of renewed feminist activism and scholarly focus on gender equality, we 
must be attentive to the diverse and perhaps unexpected ways that inequality, 
discrimination and violence play out. This article was prompted by an interest in how 
discrimination is enacted specifically through the experience of menstruation. We 
have demonstrated the pervasive nature of discrimination related to menstruation 
across a range of social sites and have highlighted the importance of bringing a 
multidimensional and intersectional approach to equality to understand the full extent 
(and diversity of experience) of this discrimination. Understanding this 
discrimination as an issue of reproductive justice enables us to think about how 
private bodily matters are shaped by economic and social forces, historical factors 
such as colonialism and eugenics, and how systemic issues of poverty, race and 
gender shape the bodily experiences of women and girls in different ways and spaces. 
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Our discussion suggests that Australian discrimination law should be used to 
address discrimination related to menstruation through creative efforts to bring such 
claims within the existing framework of the law. This would be strategically valuable 
in surfacing previously ‘unmentionable’ issues concerning women’s bodies into the 
public space of law. However, our discussion also suggests that Australian 
discrimination law is limited in its capacity to address discrimination related to 
menstruation, since it has been quite narrowly defined and applied. As a result, it 
cannot address structural inequality and achieve transformative change. In addition, 
as shown by our discussion of discrimination related to menstruation facing 
incarcerated women, women and girls with disability, and transgender, gender-
diverse and intersex people, the structure of Australian discrimination law is attribute-
based and cannot address the complex intersections of sex and other attributes. 
Thinking across the intersectional examples we have provided, we can 
identify three important methodological directions for future scholarship on 
menstruation, gender inequality and Australian discrimination law. The first is 
attending to disconnected, hidden and unexpected places for laws and policies 
impacting on menstruation. For example, taxation laws as applied to incarcerated 
women might not be as directly relevant as laws and operational guidelines on how 
institutional spaces are managed. For women with disabilities, laws on 
discrimination in the workplace might not be as pertinent as substituted decision-
making laws that enable others to make decisions to supress or remove a woman’s 
ability to menstruate. Broader laws that enliven hierarchies of privilege between 
women, and that structurally expose some women to greater risk of being disabled 
or incarcerated, are also important areas of critique.176  
The second methodological direction is being open to tensions between law’s 
application and relevance to different groups of women. In part, this involves 
contending with the contradictions in how different groups of women occupy and 
experience public and private spaces and the implications of this for addressing 
discrimination related to menstruation in ways that implicitly assume menstruators 
are consumers and workers. 
The third methodological direction, drawing on arguments made by 
O’Connell,177 is to be mindful of the relationship between discrimination law and 
‘normalised embodiment’. This requires us to reflect on the extent to which 
discrimination law can contend with diverse and abject embodiment or itself is 
premised on and reifies normalised embodiment. 
In starting to trace a broader research agenda on menstruation and inequality, 
there is much scope for further scholarship, including in the following areas:  
(1) The use of different legal methods to address menstrual inequalities, for 
example, legislative reform, judicial decision-making, policy 
frameworks and truth commissions; 
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(2) The place of menstrual pain and its impact on experiences of 
discrimination related to menstruation;  
(3) The implications of perceived impacts of hormones and menstruation on 
women’s behaviour ranging from judicial and managerial decision-
making through to criminal offending; 
(4) The legal and equality dynamics of pharmaceuticals and biotechnologies 
relating to menstruation and female hormones more broadly; 
(5) The legal and equality issues that emerge at the intersections of 
sustainable menstrual products and environmental justice; 
(6) Discrimination related to menstruation within international human rights 
law and international development law; and 
(7) Redress for historical and contemporary menstruation injustices. 
